My book project, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Success of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, explores the causes and efficacy of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Since the 1970s, I argue that the United States has credibly linked continued U.S. economic and military support to nonproliferation and has thereby dramatically raised the costs of proliferation for states within the U.S. sphere of influence. As a result, states that may have desired nuclear weapons for reasons of security, domestic politics, or prestige are deterred from proliferating because these very same objectives are endangered by the threat of U.S. sanctions. The project also explores the origins of these policies, arguing that the key triggers were the Chinese and Indian nuclear tests, which threatened to unleash nuclear domino effects that would undermine U.S. geostrategic dominance and thereby convinced the U.S. government to abandon selective proliferation schemes that acquiesced or even supported proliferation by allies.
In examining the effectiveness of the U.S. nonproliferation policies, the project employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I examine countries that were interested in nuclear weapons before and after the United States developed strong nonproliferation policies. I show that once these policies were instituted, the United States was able to successfully steer countries within its sphere of influence off the nuclear path but was unable to do so for countries outside its sphere. I explore Pakistan as an outlier case that was in the U.S. sphere but did not abandon its nuclear efforts. Second, as evidence for the deterrent effect of U.S. sanctions, I employ quantitative analysis on a global sample of countries from 1950-2000. The bulk of this research was published in International Organization in 2014, and shows that states dependent on the U.S. for economic and military support have been significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, but only after the development of credible sanctions policies in the late 1970s. This also helps explain why the observed cases of nonproliferation sanctions have been largely ineffective, as only states insulated from the U.S. have proliferated since these policies were instituted.
As evidence for the causes of U.S. nonproliferation policies, I utilize archival documents to show how the 1964 Chinese and 1974 Indian nuclear tests caused fears of nuclear domino effects that caused U.S. policymakers to abandon selective proliferation policies and support the formation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and ultimately strong sanctions policies.
In examining the effectiveness of the U.S. nonproliferation policies, the project employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. First, I examine countries that were interested in nuclear weapons before and after the United States developed strong nonproliferation policies. I show that once these policies were instituted, the United States was able to successfully steer countries within its sphere of influence off the nuclear path but was unable to do so for countries outside its sphere. I explore Pakistan as an outlier case that was in the U.S. sphere but did not abandon its nuclear efforts. Second, as evidence for the deterrent effect of U.S. sanctions, I employ quantitative analysis on a global sample of countries from 1950-2000. The bulk of this research was published in International Organization in 2014, and shows that states dependent on the U.S. for economic and military support have been significantly less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, but only after the development of credible sanctions policies in the late 1970s. This also helps explain why the observed cases of nonproliferation sanctions have been largely ineffective, as only states insulated from the U.S. have proliferated since these policies were instituted.
As evidence for the causes of U.S. nonproliferation policies, I utilize archival documents to show how the 1964 Chinese and 1974 Indian nuclear tests caused fears of nuclear domino effects that caused U.S. policymakers to abandon selective proliferation policies and support the formation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and ultimately strong sanctions policies.
